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BAR BRIEFS
dollars per year, and therefore we cannot afford larger monthly
numbers on our present income.
Would you like it published bi-monthly, or quarterly better?
So that news and comment could appear. Press releases from the
American Bar Association are generally from three pages up-
would you like them published? Would you prefer the present
form changed partially or wholly? Your executive committee and
officers would like to know. But please remember that our an-
nual income was less last year than the year before, and will be
less this year than last, and will continue to diminish for the
duration.
Let's have your comment, wishes, and suggestions.
ATTENTION
It has been suggested that our members might like to have
at least the Judicial Practice Titles of our new code printed on
one side only, so as to have more room for annotating the sections
as decisions are handed down. The extra cost would be small if
done in connection with the printing of the regular edition.
Please advise Senator J. J. Kehoe, Chairman of the Interim Com-
mittee at Bismarck if you favor this.
BANKRUPTCY
Definition of Farmer Under Section 75 (r)
Whether an individual is recognized as a farmer within the
meaning of section 75 (r) of the National Bankruptcy Act (52
St. 840), as amended by the Frazier-Lemke Act (49 St. at L. 943),
and is eligible for agricultural compositions is a question of fact
to be decided upon by a hearing and a consideration of all pertin-
ent facts had before a judge or by reference to a master. 8 C. J.
S. section 95.
Essentially the debtor qualifies as a farmer either because
he is "personally, bona-fide engaged in farming operations or
because the principal part of his income is derived from such
operations." National Bankruptcy Act, section 75 (r). This
definition is worded in the alternative and "is to be used by way
of contrast." First National Bank v. Beach, 301 U. S. 435
(1937). With a few exceptions the court assumes that section
75 (r) is the controlling definition of "farmer" for the purpose
of gaining special benefits offered by section 75. In re Moser,
95 F. (2d) 944 1938); In re McCoy, 17 F. Supp. 973 (1936); In
re Knight, 9 F. Supp. 502 (1934). Contra: Benitz v. Bank of
Nova Scotia, 109 F. (2d) 743 (1940). The second half of the
above definition, "or the principal part of the debtor's income,"
becomes important only "when the debtor is engaged in two or
more pursuits to such an extent it would be difficult to say
which, if any, was the principal one." In re Pollock, 46 F. Supp.
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358 (1942). A farm owner who received a share of the crops
produced by the tenant amounting to approximately seven hun-
dred dollars, had no active part in farming the land and was em-
ployed as a school teacher at a salary of from eighty to one
hundred dollars a month. Held, the debtor was not a "farmer"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act entitled to agricul-
tural compositions and extensions. In re McCoy, 17 F. Supp.
972 (1936) ; cf. In re Davis, 22 F. Supp. 12 (1938) ; In re Pollock,
supra. Without exception courts have held that the operation
of farming in actuality, must be personal in that the debtor is
tilling the soil himself or through the supervision of hired labor-
ers. "True, Congress must have intended the second part of the
definition (the principal source of income) to enlarge the class
over that specifically included in the first part of the definition
('personally, bona-fide engaged in farming'). But it does not
follow that it intended the enlarged class to include one who is
not personally engaged in farming. The principal part of the in-
come refers to the foregoing definition of farming operations."
Shyvers v. Security First Nattional Bank, 108 F. (2d) 611 (1939),
certiorari denied 60 S. Ct. 608 (1940); cf. Williams vs. Great
Southern Life Insurance Co. et al., 124 F. (2d) 38 (1938) ; In re
Pollock, supra p. 358; In re Olson, 21 F. Supp. 504 (1939). As a
general rule it can be stated that one who pays no expenses, takes
no risks, and can suffer no losses except in the event of a total
crop failure, is not primarily, personally engaged in farming, and
as a result is not entitled to agricultural compositions and exten-
sions. 8 C. J. S. section 95; cf. In re Wright's Estate, 91 F. (2d)
894 (1937). The difficulty is determining whether the farmer
who makes investments in other fields of commercial endeavor is
entitled to agricultural compositions and extensions is usually re-
solved by looking to the fact, if present, that the indebedness
arose in the business of farming rather than in the collateral pur-
suit. Nicholson v. Williams and Shelton Co. Inc. et al., 121 F.
(2d) 740, 741 (1941), affirmed 36 F. Supp. 308 (1940). A recent
decision holds that the debtor must have more than a newly
acquired equitable right in the farm before the debtor is recog-
nized as a "farmer." McLean v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha,
130 F. (2d) 123 (1942).
The distinctive trend running throughout decisions in de-
termining whether an individual engaged in two or more pursuits
is a "farmer" entitled to special benefits under section 75 has
been to place emphasis on the relative amount of income, derived
from the farming, the permanency and reliance on farming as
a means of livelihood, the pursuit in which the indebtedness
arose, and whether or not there was supervision of farming oper-
ations. No separate factor is controlling, and as stated before
each case is a separate and original question of fact that must be
decided on its own merits.
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